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1979] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
in any action involving a status determination following the death
of one spouse, however, remains unclear.
William J. Cople III
ARTICLE 14 - CONmIBUTON
Concurrent tortfeasor in child's wrongful death action entitled to
seek contribution from parent who negligently entrusted child with
a dangerous instrument
Following the abandonment of the doctrine of intrafamilial tort
immunity" in Gelbman v. Gelbman,75 the question arose whether a
child could maintain a cause of action for negligent supervision
against his parent."0 In Holodook v. Spencer,"s the Court of Appeals
Is The doctrine of intrafamilial immunity first appeared in 1891 when a Mississippi
court, citing no prior authority, established the rule with respect to intentional torts based
on considerations of public policy. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). While
there appears to be no common-law basis for prohibiting tort actions between parent and
child, see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030,
1059-63 (1930), the justifications for invoking the doctrine of intrafamilial tort immunity have
included: (1) the preservation of domestic tranquility; (2) the foreclosure of fraudulent
claims; (3) the prevention of the depletion of family resources; (4) the avoidance of possible
-parental succession to the child's award; (5) the similarity to the common-law doctrine of
interspousal immunity; and (6) the protection of the parents' inherent rights of supervision,
discipline and control over their children. Id. at 1072-77. This immunity later was extended
to nonwillful torts. See 33 ALBANY L. REv. 438 (1969).
The intrafamilial immunity doctrine was first adopted by the New York Court of Appeals
in Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928), wherein a child's cause of
action against his father to recover for injuries caused by the latter's negligent driving was
dismissed. Id. at 627, 162 N.E. at 551. The rule was reaffirmed in two automobile injury suits
by minors against their parents. See Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718,
215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961); Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942). See generally
McCurdy, supra, at 1066-81.
71 23 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (1969), discussed in
Recent Developments, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 127, 133 (1969). In Gelbman, the Court permit-
ted a mother to bring a tort action against her unemancipated son to recover for injuries
sustained in an automobile collision allegedly caused by his negligencq, see 23 N.Y.2d at 436,
245 N.E.2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 530, thereby overruling its prior contrary decisions. See
Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961); Cannon v.
Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E.
551 (1928); note 78 supra. It is interesting to note that, although it was apparent that an
insurer ultimately would pay any judgment, the Gelbman Court did not restrict its holding
to those instances where liability insurance was available. See 23 N.Y.2d at 438, 245 N.E.2d
at 193-94, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 531; 42 BRooKLYN L. REV. 125, 131 (1975). But cf. 44 NOME DAME
LAw. 1001 (1969) (immunity should be retained in the absence of insurance). See generally
19 CATH. U.L. REV. 113, 118 (1969); 15 N.Y.L.F. 419, 424-25 (1969).
61 Although the Gelbman Court cautioned that, "[b]y abolishing the defense of intra-
family tort immunity for nonwillful torts, [they were] not creating liability where none
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refused to recognize such an action, s2 notwithstanding that a parent
could be held liable to third parties for injuries resulting from the
negligent supervision of a child. 3 Despite this apparent duty to
previously existed," 23 N.Y.2d at 439, 245 N.E.2d at 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 532, the decision
raised questions concerning the legal obligations and duties a parent owes to a child. See
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 44, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 867 (1974). A
parent's duty to supervise his unemancipated child was first recognized in New York in
Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839), wherein a 2-year-old child was struck
by a horse-drawn sleigh after he had wandered from his parent's property onto the roadway.
Id. at 616. The court indicated that under certain circumstances, a parent leaving his child
unattended and exposed to danger may be considered presumptively negligent. See id. at 618-
19; 60 ComNEuL L. REv. 1105, 1109 (1975). The court concluded, however, that the parent's
contributory negligence was to be imputed to the child, thus barring the child's suit against
the sleigh driver. 21 Wend. at 619-20. The rule of presumptive negligence established by
Hartfield was later clarified in Mangam v. Brooklyn R.R., 38 N.Y. 455 (1868), where the Court
of Appeals concluded that improper supervision by a parent was not negligence per se, but
rather required a factual determination using an "ordinary care" test. Id. at 457; see Weil v.
Dry Dock, East Broadway & Battery R.R., 119 N.Y. 147, 153, 23 N.E. 487, 488 (1890).
Hartfield's rule of imputed parental contributory negligence, which had been the subject of
harsh criticism, see PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 74, at 490 (4th ed. 1971), later was refined
when it was held that imputation would occur only where the conduct of an infant non sui
juris amounted to what would be negligent conduct for a person sui juris. Ihl v. Forty-second
St. & Grand St. Ferry R.R., 47 N.Y. 317, 323 (1872). The legislative overruling of the doctrine
of imputed parental negligence, N.Y. GEN. OBuo. LAw § 3-111 (1975), eventually necessitated
a reconsideration of the negligent supervision issue since Hartfield seemed to suggest the
possibility that negligent supervision could serve as a basis for a cause of action by a child
against his parent. See 21 Wend. at 620; Mangam v. Brooklyn R.R., 38 N.Y. 455, 457 (1868);
60 CORNELL L. REv. 1105, 1107, 1110 (1975).
36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
82 Id. at 40, 324 N.E.2d at 339, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 862. In Holodook, an action was instituted
by the father of a 4-year-old infant who was injured when he was struck by the defendant's
automobile after he "allegedly [had] darted out from between parked cars." Id. at 42, 324
N.E.2d at 341, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 864. The defendant counterclaimed and brought a third-party
action against the child's father and mother, respectively, in order to obtain an apportion-
ment of damages, alleging that they negligently had failed to perform their parental duties.
Id. Judge Rabin, writing for the majority, noted that, "[h]istorically, . . . negligent supervi-
sion has not been a tort, actionable by the child. . . [and] should not now be recognized as
[such] a tort .... " Id. at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 867. The Court was
influenced strongly by the effect a Dole claim for contribution, see note 84 infra, would have
on parents who might be reluctant to pursue the child's remedy against a third party, for fear
of being held liable to the third party for a part of the child's damages. See 36 N.Y.2d at 46,
324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868. The Court considered such a result to be "obviously
detrimental to the injured child." Id.; see note 118 and accompanying text infra. In addition,
the Court was concerned with the difficulties of defining an act of negligent supervision, 36
N.Y.2d at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 342, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 867, and establishing a standard of care to
be applied in such cases. Id. at 49, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 870-71. The Holodook
Court concluded that, only when the parent's conduct would be actionable by the child in
the absence of the family relationship, will the child have a cause of action against the parent.
Id. at 50-51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871-72.
Holodook has been criticized as an unnecessarily broad exception to the non-immunity
rule declared by Gelbman. See 42 BROoKLYN L. REv. 125, 146 (1975).
1 36 N.Y.2d at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 342, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 866; see, e.g., Latta v. Siefke, 60
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third parties, the Holodook Court emphasized that the absence of
a supervisory duty to the injured child necessarily defeated any
claim for contribution asserted against a parent by a tortfeasor. s"
Recently, however, in Nolechek v. Gesuale,15 the Court of Appeals
held that a parent owes a duty to third parties not to expose them
to tort liability for an infant's injuries resulting from the parent's
negligent entrustment of a dangerous instrument to his child,86 and
that the breach of this duty would support a claim for contribution
against the parent.
In Nolechek, the plaintiff had provided his unlicensed 16-year-
old son, whose vision was severely impaired,88 with an unregistered
motorcycle. After exchanging motorcycles with a friend, the son was
killed when he rode into a steel cable which had been suspended
across the road by the defendants to close off the entrance to their
property. 9 The father, individually and as the administrator of the
estate of his son, brought a wrongful-death action claiming that the
App. Div. 2d 991, 401 N.Y.S.2d 937 (4th Dep't 1978); Pico v. Canini, 47 App. Div. 2d 951,
367 N.Y.S.2d 304 (2d Dep't 1975); Stasky v. Bernardon, 81 Misc. 2d 1067, 367 N.Y.S.2d 449
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975); note 102 and accompanying text infra.
84 36 N.Y.2d at 51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 872. In Dole v. Dow Chem. Co.,
30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), the Court of Appeals enunciated
the principles of apportioning damages among joint or concurrent tortfeasors, which later was
codified in CPLR article 14. See generally CPLR 3019, commentary at 37 (Supp. 1978-1979);
TWELFTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1973), in TWENTIETH ANN. REP.
N.Y. JuD. CONFERENcE 197, 213-18 (1975). The Dole Court stated:
[W]here a third party is found to have been responsible for a part, but not all, of
the negligence for which a defendant is cast in damages, the responsibility for that
part is recoverable by the prime defendant against the third party. To reach that
end there must necessarily be an apportionment of responsibility in negligence
between those parties.
30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. The apportionment rules,
however, seem to indicate that a defendant may not seek apportionment by way of counter-
claim or third-party claim unless there exists a primary cause of action between the plaintiff
and the defendant in the counterclaim or third-party claim. See Holodook v. Spencer, 36
N.Y.2d 35, 51, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 872 (1974); Barry v. Niagara Frontier
Transit Sys. Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 629, 633, 324 N.E.2d 312, 313, 364 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (1974);
Rogers v. Dorchester Assoc., 32 N.Y.2d 553, 564, 300 N.E.2d 403, 409, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22, 31
(1973); CPLR 1401 (1976).
- 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978), modifying 58 App. Div. 2d
885, 396 N.Y.S.2d 881 (2d Dep't 1977).
86 46 N.Y.2d at 340, 385 N.E.2d at 1273, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
'7 Id. at 336, 385 N.E.2d at 1270-71, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 342-43.
Id. at 337, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343. At the time of the accident, the
son was blind in one eye and had impaired and uncorrectable vision in the other eye. Id.
11 Id. at 336-37, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343. The plaintiff's son was accom-
panied by a friend with whom he had exchanged motorcycles just prior to the accident. Id.
at 337, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
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defendants"0 were negligent in allowing a hazardous condition to
exist without taking proper safety measures. 1 The defendants coun-
terclaimed for contribution, alleging that the father was negligent
in providing his visually-handicapped son with a dangerous instru-
ment.2 The trial court denied a motion to dismiss the counter-
claim. 3 In accordance with Holodook, 4 the Appellate Division, Sec-
ond Department, reversed the order and held that the absence of a
primary cause of action for negligent supervision precluded the sec-
ondary counterclaim for apportionment of damages."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reinstated the counterclaim,"
holding that, where a parent's negligent entrustment of a dangerous
instrument to his child causes a "concurrent [ly]" negligent third
party to incur liability for the child's injuries, the third party may
seek contribution from the parent. Writing for the 'majority, Chief
Judge Breitel" declined to adopt a "dangerous instrument" excep-
tion to the Holodook rule.9 Reasoning that a parent's decision with
respect to a child's use of a potentially dangerous instrument was
not sufficiently distinguishable from supervisory decisions in gen-
eral, 00 the Court concluded that such an exception was "neither
0Id. The named defendants were Thomas Gesuale, the Star Sand and Gravel Company,
the owners of the adjacent property, the Town of Smithtown and its superintendent of
highways. Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. The plaintiff, in response to the counterclaim, interposed a third-party complaint
against his son's companion and the companion's father, claiming that they, and not he, had
provided his son with the motorcycle that was involved in the accident. Id.
,1 46 N.Y.2d at 336, 385 N.E.2d at 1270, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 342. The Supreme Court,
Suffolk County, also denied a motion to dismiss the father's third-party complaint against
his son's friend and his father. 58 App. Div. 2d at 886, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
' See notes 81 & 82 and accompanying text supra.
Is 58 App. Div. 2d at 886, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 882-83.
" 46 N.Y.2d at 336, 385 N.E.2d at 1270, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343. The Court allowed the
appellate division's dismissal of the third-party claim to stand, holding that the allegations
were without merit since the exchange of motorcycles was not the proximate cause of the
injury. Id. at 341, 385 N.E.2d at 1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
"Id.
' Chief Judge Breitel was joined by Judges Jasen, Jones and Wachtler. Judges Gabrielli
and Fuchsberg concurred in the result, each writing a separate opinion. Judge Cooke dis-
sented in a separate opinion.
11 46 N.Y.2d at 337-38, 385 N.E.2d at 1271-72, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
"0 See id. at 337-38, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343-44. The Court emphasized
that, since parents are in the unique position to best judge the capabilities of their children,
a parent's decision to entrust what might be a dangerous instrument to a minor child went
to the heart of the exercise of the parental right to supervise. Id. at 338, 385 N.E.2d at 1272,
413 N.Y.S.2d at 344; see Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 49-51, 324 N.E.2d 338, 345-47,
364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 870-72 (1974); note 119 infra. Moreover, the Court theorized that, had the
unfortunate accident occurred on family property, the operation of a dangerous instrument
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analytically persuasive nor practically sound."'"' Nevertheless, it
was emphasized that parents would incur liability for harm accru-
ing to a third party in such a situation.12 Postulating that a third
party's "exposure to tort liability" is one of the many types of harm
foreseeable in such a situation,"3 Chief Judge Breitel stated that,
when a parent negligently permits his child to use a dangerous
instrument, he has breached a legal duty to protect those who may
be exposed to such harm."4 Declaring that neither the absence of a
duty running from the parent to the child' 5 nor the type of harm
incurred by the "concurrent" tortfeasor should free the parent from
liability, the Court held that the breach of the duty owed to the
exception to the Holodook rule could result in one parent, either individually or in a repre-
sentative capacity, instituting a wrongful-death action against the other which could result
in a windfall to both parents while their homeowner's insurance carrier sustained the actual
damages. 46 N.Y.2d at 338, 385 N.E.2d at 1272, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
101 Id.
I- Id. at 340, 385 N.E.2d at 1273, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 345. As stated by the Court in
Holodook:
Failure to supervise may entail legal consequence where injury to a third party
results, for example, under circumstances where a parent negligently entrusts to his
child a dangerous instrument, or an instrument potentially dangerous in the child's
hands, so as to create an unreasonable risk to others.
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 45, 324 N.E.2d 338, 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 866 (1974);
see, e.g., Lichtenthal v. Gawoski, 44 App. Div. 2d 771, 772, 354 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (4th Dep't
1974); Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 35 App. Div. 2d 114, 117, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018,
1020 (2d Dep't 1970), aff'd mem., 31 N.Y.2d 830, 291 N.E.2d 724, 339 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1972);
Carmona v. Padilla, 4 App. Div. 2d 181, 183, 163 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (1st Dep't 1957), affl'd, 4
N.Y.2d 767, 149 N.E.2d 337, 172 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1958); Zuckerberg v. Munzer, 277 App. Div.
1061, 100 N.Y.S.2d 910 (2d Dep't 1950) (mem.); Agnesini v. Olsen, 277 App. Div. 1006, 100
N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't 1950) (mem.); cf. Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. 518, 293
N.Y.S. 147 (2d Dep't 1937) (per curiam) (parents not negligent in entrusting bicycle to infant
son). Compare Kucklik v. Feuer, 239 App. Div. 338, 267 N.Y.S. 256 (1st Dep't 1933), aff'd
mem., 264 N.Y. 542, 199 N.E. 555 (1934) with Napiearlski v. Pickering, 278 App. Div. 456,
106 N.Y.S.2d 28 (4th Dep't 1951). The Nolechek Court indicated that the duty involved is
not owed to the child himself, but rather to a third party who stands to be injured by the
child's actions. 46 N.Y.2d at 339, 385 N.E.2d at 1273, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 345; see Lichtenthal
v. Gawoski, 44 App. Div. 2d 771, 772, 354 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (4th Dep't 1974).
1 46 N.Y.2d at 340, 385 N.E.2d at 1273, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 345. In situations where a child
is entrusted with a dangerous instrument, the Court considered not only the possible injuries
to bystanders and damages to property, but also the possible tort liability of a third party
who may have contributed to the child's injuries. Id.
IN4 Id. But see note 111 and accompanying text infra.
'c Chief Judge Breitel supported his sanction of a contribution claim in the absence of
a child-parent cause of action by analogy to the worker's compensation situation, where a
third party who is liable in tort for injury to an employee may seek contribution from the
employer whose own negligence contributed to the employee's injury, despite the statutory
prohibition of a direct employee-employer suit. 46 N.Y.2d at 339, 385 N.E.2d at 1272-73, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 345; see N.Y. WORK. CoMp. LAw § 11 (1975). But see note 110 infra.
1979]
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third party would support a claim for contribution against the par-
ent. 
08
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Gabrielli observed that
to allow the counterclaim without acknowledging a direct child-
parent cause of action would do violence to the principles estab-
lished by Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 101 but concluded that a
direct child-parent claim should exist where the parent's conduct
amounted to gross negligence. In such a situation Judge Gabrielli
reasoned that "the standard of care may be readily defined without
infringing on the vast domain best left to parental discretion.' '0 8
Judge Fuchsberg also concurred separately, suggesting that the
Holodook rule be wholly discarded in favor of a reasonable-care-in-
light-of-the-circumstances standard.' 9
"1 46 N.Y.2d at 339-40, 385 N.E.2d at 1273, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 345. Considering the situa-
tion involved in Nolechek, Chief Judge Breitel determined that "[ilt would be repulsive to
permit the parent to recover from a third party guilty of 'concurrent' negligence for the death
of his child while preventing the third party from counterclaiming for contribution against
the parent." Id. at 342, 385 N.E.2d at 1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 346. The majority rejected the
notion that the allowance of such a non-supervision counterclaim would deter parents from
bringing tort actions on their children's behalf, reasoning that such a contention would be
inconsistent with the Gelbman rule abolishing the doctrine of intrafamilial immunity. Id. at
340-41, 385 N.E.2d at 1273, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 345-46; see Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434,
438-39, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193-94, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531-32 (1969); note 79 and accompanying
text supra. But see Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 47, 324 N.E.2d 338, 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d
859, 868 (1974); note 82 supra. The Court declared that, where the rights of third parties are
doncerned, the considerations of domestic relations which were discussed in Holodook must
be "subordinated . . .to other policy interests involved." 46 N.Y.2d at 341, 385 N.E.2d at
1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
" 46 N.Y.2d at 342-45, 385 N.E.2d at 1274-76, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 346-48 (Gabrielli, J.,
concurring); see note 84 supra.
108 46 N.Y.2d at 343, 385 N.E.2d at 1275, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 347 (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
Judge Gabrielli distinguished Holodook, noting that the conduct which was considered to be
"negligent supervision" in that case constituted only mere negligence. Id. at 342-43, 385
N.E.2d at 1275, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 347 (Gabrielli, J., concurring). Thus, he reasoned that the
policy considerations underlying Holodook's recognition of parental immunity, see notes 82
& 84 supra, were not applicable when the parental conduct in question was grossly negligent.
46 N.Y.2d at 343, 385 N.E.2d at 1275, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 347. (Gabrielli, J., concurring). Judge
Gabrielli was of the opinion that precise jury instructions would limit recovery to the proper
case and that family disruption would be at a minimum. Id. (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
Moreover, Judge Gabrielli stated that the recognition of direct parent-child liability would
not only result in an equitable decision, but it would also prevent the perversion of the
principles established by Dole. Id. at 344-45, 385 N.E.2d at 1276, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 348
(Gabrielli, J., concurring).
100 46 N.Y.2d at 346, 385 N.E.2d at 1277, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 349 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
To support the abandonment of Holodook, Judge Fuchsberg referred to the Court of Appeals'
recent abolition of the rigid classifications that were traditionally used to determine a land-
owner's liability in favor of a single standard of reasonable care. Id. (Fuchsberg, J., concur-
ring); see Quinlan v. Cecchini, 41 N.Y.2d 686, 363 N.E.2d 578, 394 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1977);
Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 354 N.E.2d 794, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1976); Basso v.
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
Judge Cooke, dissenting vigorously, asserted that a claim for
contribution is unsupportable, absent a duty running to the injured
party."0 Moreover, the dissent declared that the majority's holding
could not be justified as creating a new cause of action in tort, since
the parent had not proximately caused the defendants to suffer any
legally-cognizable injury."' Finally, Judge Cooke decried the major-
ity decision's unfortunate potential for discouraging parents from
pursuing claims on behalf of their children."'
It is submitted that the Nolechek Court misinterpreted the
meaning of Dole and its progeny in an effort to achieve an equitable
Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976). Analogizing this related area
of tort law to negligent supervision, Judge Fuchsberg advocated the treatment of child-parent
claims on a case-by-case basis. See 46 N.Y.2d at 346-47, 385 N.E.2d at 1277, 413 N.Y.S.2d
at 349 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
"10 46 N.Y.2d at 347-48, 385 N.E.2d at 1278-79, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 350-51 (Cooke, J.,
dissenting). Although Judge Cooke agreed with the majority's refusal to create a cause of
action in favor of a child against his parent for negligent supervision, id. at 347, 385 N.E.2d
at 1278, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 350 (Cooke, J., dissenting), he suggested that the majority's decision
to permit one who is not concurrently liable for injury to the plaintiff to be subject to a Dole
contribution claim, "marks a sudden, unexplained departure from prior well-reasoned deci-
sions." Id. (Cooke, J., dissenting); see Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d
288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972); Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d
241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972); note 84 supra. Judge Cooke reasoned that, "[i]f the person
from whom contribution is sought owes no duty to the injured plaintiff, . . . he simply is not
a joint or concurrent tort-feasor . . . [and] no apportionment may be granted." 46 N.Y.2d
at 348, 385 N.E.2d at 1278, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 350 (Cooke, J., dissenting); see CPLR 1401 (1976);
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRS § 50, at 309 (4th ed. 1971). The dissent also questioned the
majority's analogy to the worker's compensation situation. 46 N.Y.2d at 348-49, 385 N.E.2d
at 1278-79, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 351. (Cooke, J., dissenting); see note 104 supra. Judge Cooke
pointed out that, although direct job-related injury suits against an employer are barred by
statute, see N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 11 (1975), the employer nonetheless owes the employee
a duty of care which, if breached, subjects him to damages by way of contribution. 46 N.Y.2d
at 348-49, 385 N.E.2d at 1278-79, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (Cooke, J., dissenting); see Briscoe v.
Williams, 50 App. Div. 2d 883, 377 N.Y.S.2d 163 (2d Dep't 1975).
"1 46 N.Y.2d at 349, 385 N.E.2d at 1279, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
The dissent criticized the majority's holding as "creating a new tort cause of action which
defendants may assert directly against [the plaintiff without having] suffered any injury
recognized by tort law." Id. (Cooke, J., dissenting) (citing W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF Toars
§§ 30, 41-44 (4th ed. 1971)).
"1 46 N.Y.2d at 349-50, 385 N.E.2d at 1279, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 351-52 (Cooke, J., dissent-
ing); see Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 46, 324 N.E.2d 338, 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 868;
note 82 supra; note 118 and accompanying text infra. The dissent observed that, even if
parents did institute claims on behalf of their injured children, the effect of the child's
recovery on the parent's financial resources might create family conflicts. 46 N.Y.2d at 350,
385 N.E.2d at 1279, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (Cooke, J., dissenting). Moreover, Judge Cooke was
disturbed by the majority's adoption of an exception to the Holodook rule which would add
an extra burden of potential tort liability to the parents of handicapped children. Id. at 350,
385 N.E.2d at 1279, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 352 (Cooke, J., dissenting); see CPLR 3019, commentary
at 253 (1974).
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result. The well-established principles of contribution,"' as codified
in CPLR 1401,114 permit an apportionment of damages only among
those who might be liable to the injured plaintiff.15 Consequently,
the Nolechek majority's sanctioning of a claim for contribution
against a party owing no duty whatsoever to the injured party" 6
appears to be irreconcilable with these principles." '7
It additionally appears that the Court's failure to recognize a
direct child-parent cause of action in Nolechek may have the unfor-
tunate effect of neutralizing the policy considerations which form
the foundation of Holodook. At the root of its refusal to acknowledge
negligent supervision as an actionable tort in Holodook was the
", See note 84 supra.
"1 CPLR 1401 (1976). Section 1401 provides:
[Tiwo or more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same
personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution
among them whether or not an action has been brought or a judgment has been
rendered against the person from whom contribution is sought. (Emphasis added).
Significantly, as pointed out by the Nolechek dissent, potential exposure to tort liability has
never before been equated to personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death by legal
authorities. See 46 N.Y.2d at 349, 385 N.E.2d at 1279, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (Cooke, J.,
dissenting); note 111 supra..
"25 See TWELFTH ANN. REP. OF THE Jun. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1973), in TwENTmrm
ANN. REP. N.Y. Jun. CONFERENCE 194 (1975); note 84 supra.
Il See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
II As expressed by the dissent, quoting Chief Judge Breitel:
The rule of apportionment applies when two or more tort-feasors have shared, albeit
in various degrees, in the responsibility by their conduct or omissions in causing
an accident, in violation of the duties they respectively owed to the injured person.
46 N.Y.2d at 348, 385 N.E.2d at 1278, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (Cooke, J., dissenting) (quoting
Rogers v. Dorchester Assoc., 32 N.Y.2d 553, 564, 300 N.E.2d 403, 409, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22, 31
(1973) (emphasis added by Judge Cooke). The Nolechek majority seems to have overlooked
that the presence of an actionable parental duty is a necessary element of a contribution
claim. Moreover, in its attempt to preserve Holodook, the Nolechek Court has left the anom-
aly that the presence of an additional tortfeasor seemingly controls whether parental liability
will arise from negligent supervisory conduct. Where injury is incurred at a place isolated
from the influence of a third party, no enforceable claim against a parent for the negligent
entrustment of a dangerous instrument would exist between child and parent. See 46 N.Y.2d
at 338-40, 385 N.E.2d at 1273, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 344-45. Where, however, the injury results
from a combination of tortious acts committed by the parent and third parties, parental
liability vis-a-vis the third party would arise in the form of contribution. This irreconcilable
result was achieved by the Court through the recognition of a new duty between parents and
third parties: a duty based on concepts of foreseeable risk requiring parents to shield third
parties from potential exposure to tort liability. See note 104 and accompanying text supra;
McLaughlin, Dole v. Dow (continued), N.Y.L.J., March 9, 1979, at 2, cols. 3-4. Unfortun-
ately, the suggested harm caused to a third party by "exposure to tort liability" will not
always develop into actual damages since they are contingent on the outcome of the litigation.
Thus, the traditional tort injuries contemplated by the Holodook Court as a basis for a cause
of action, see 36 N.Y.2d at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 866, are inapposite to the
speculative harm caused by exposing another to tort liability which the Nolechek Court
recognized as supporting the contribution claim.
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Court's concern with the impact Dole contribution would have upon
family harmony."' According to Nolechek, however, whenever a
parent's negligent entrustment of an arguably "dangerous instru-
ment" ' to his child subjects a third party to suit for the child's
injuries, the parent will be liable for Dole contribution, the very
result the Holodook Court wished to avoid."' It would appear, there-
fore, that the Nolechek Court has stripped Holodook of its essence
by nominally adhering to the mandate that a child cannot directly
sue his parent. 2'
In contrast, it is submitted that the gross-negligence exception
proposed by Judge Gabrielli"' would have been the wisest choice.
Such a narrow exception would have done little to weaken Holodook
since it could not be argued logically that extreme carelessness lies
"I See Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 45-48, 324 N.E.2d 338, 343-44, 364 N.Y.S.2d
859, 867-69 (1974); note 82 supra. The Holodook majority observed that "[ilt [would be]
artificial to separate the parent and child as economic entities," and that if Dole third-party
complaints or counterclaims were asserted against uninsured parents, the resulting depletion
of the family's financial resources would put an unavoidable strain upon the intrafamilial
relationship. 36 N.Y.2d at 47, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868. Noting that the courts
have consistently sought to avoid such a result, Judge Rabin stated that "Holodook illustrates
that if a negligent supervision claim is allowed, the rights and procedures granted to a
defendant by Dole directly collide with the policies of promoting family harmony." Id. at 48,
324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 869. The Holodook Court also feared that possible Dole
liability might make parents reluctant to pursue their children's legitimate claims. Id. at 46,
324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868; see 42 BROoKLYN L. REv. 125, 135-36 (1975); note 82
supra. Similarly, this concern was recognized in Nolechek by Judge Cooke, who argued that
"the spectre of liability might well deter the parents from instituting a lawsuit on behalf of
their child." 46 N.Y.2d at 350, 385 N.E.2d at 1279, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (Cooke, J., dissent-
ing).
In addition, the Holodook Court expressed the view that, to allow a Dole counterclaim
against a parent for negligent supervision would be inconsistent with § 3-111 of the General
Obligations Law, N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-111 (1978), since it would have the effect of
permitting the parent's negligence to be imputed to the child. 36 N.Y.2d at 48, 324 N.E.2d
at 345, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 869. While it is well-settled that an injured party's right to recover
damages is independent of any concurrent tortfeasor's Dole claims, see CPLR 1404 (1976),
that right certainly will be hampered in a Nolechek situation where third-party counterclaims
against a parent may result in the forfeiture of the child's award.
"I As noted by Chief Judge Brietel, what constitutes a "dangerous instrument" will often
depend upon the circumstances in which it is used. See 46 N.Y.2d at 337, 385 N.E.2d at 1271,
413 N.Y.S.2d at 344; see note 21 supra.
'' See note 118 supra.
" While Nolechek has affirmed Holodook's refusal to recognize a child's cause of action
for negligent parental supervision, see 46 N.Y.2d at 338-40, 385 N.E.2d at 1273, 413 N.Y.S.2d
at 344-45, by permitting a Dole counterclaim when negligent entrustment of a dangerous
instrument to a child is involved, it apparently has disregarded the underlying judicial con-
cern with the disruptive effect of such a claim on family harmony. See note 37 and accompa-
nying text supra.
M 46 N.Y.2d at 343, 385 N.E.2d at 1275, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 347 (Gabrielli, J., concurring);
see notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text supra.
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within the boundaries of parental discretion.'2 Finally, the recogni-
tion of such a cause of action would have supported a claim for
contribution, thereby preventing the tortured application of Dole. ,24
In view of the confusion and possible inequity which seem likely to
result,'2 it is hoped that the Court of Appeals will reexamine its
position.
John F. Farmer
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
CPL § 200.50: Court of Appeals clarifies requirements of factual
statement in indictment
Section 200.50 of the CPL sets forth the requisite form and
content of an indictment and mandates that it contain a "plain and
concise factual statement" which supports all elements of the crime
charged with sufficient preciseness to afford the defendant notice of
the conduct for which he stands accused. 26 The absence of specific
I See 46 N.Y.2d at 343, 385 N.E.2d at 1275, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 347 (Gabrielli, J., concur-
ring); note 108 and accompanying text supra. Judge Gabrielli noted that the major difficulty
the courts have faced in negligent supervision cases has been the establishment of an accepta-
ble standard of good parental care. 46 N.Y.2d at 343, 385 N.E.2d at 1275, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
347 (Gabrielli, J., concurring). This difficulty is drastically reduced, however, when the
parental conduct can be classified as grossly negligent. Id. (Gabrielli, J., concurring). In the
event of egregious parental conduct within the parent-child relationship, the weighty policy
considerations in respect to harmonious family relations become subordinated to the more
compelling interests of providing a remedy for the injured child and allocating to a marginally
negligent third party his rightful share of the damages. See id. at 344, 385 N.E.2d at 1276,
413 N.Y.S.2d at 348 (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
Moreover, it is submitted that, were the Court to define a standard of care to be applied
to parents whose conduct toward their children is considered gross, reckless or wanton, par-
ents would not be faced with an undue burden of shielding themselves from liability. While
a cognizable action for mere negligent supervision might cause parents to be overprotective
and "result in a society of reliant individuals, incapable of making responsible judgments
respecting the propriety of their own actions," 42 BaooKLYN L. REv. 125, 136 (1975), it is
unlikely that those concerns would develop under Judge Gabrielli's gross negligence standard.
"'i See notes 84 & 110 and accompanying text supra.
'2 See notes 113-114 and accompanying text supra.
25 CPL § 200.50(7)(a) (Supp. 1978-1979) states that an indictment must contain
[a] plain and concise factual statement in each court which, without allegations
of an evidentiary nature,
(a) asserts facts supporting every element of the offense charged and the
defendant's or defendants' commission thereof with sufficient precision to clearly
apprise the defendant or defendants of the conduct which is the subject of the
accusation . ...
The Court of Appeals, in People v. Farson, 244 N.Y. 413, 155 N.E. 724 (1927), stated that
an indictment would be sufficient
